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R. v. N.S.: WHAT IS FAIR IN A TRIAL?
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S DIVIDED OPINION
ON THE NIQAB IN THE COURTROOM
FAISAL BHABHA

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2008, a woman entered an Ontario courtroom to give evidence at a preliminary inquiry
involving childhood sexual assault charges against her uncle and cousin. She sought to testify
while wearing a niqab, a garment that conceals the entire head and face, leaving only an
opening for the eyes.' The Court was asked to decide the novel question of whether it could
accommodate the Muslim veil in a justice system that provides the accused with a right to
face his accuser. The Supreme Court ofCanada divided three ways, with justices disagreeing
deeply both about the analysis for determining whether to permit a witness to wear the niqab
and the values and interests at play in the analysis.
While the majority judgment endorsed a variety of commitments to fundamental
constitutional principles, it left unresolved tension in the articulation of essential components
oftrial fairness. Framed as a collision between equally important CanadianCharterofRights
andFreedoms2 rights, the majority's effort at reconciliation and balancing paired rhetorical
guarantees of substantive equality and respect for difference and multiculturalism with
vanishing results for members of a marginalized social group - in this case, veiled Muslim
women. The likely adverse impact of the judgment on this. group will only confirm the
aphorism that hard cases make bad law, and highlights the need for constitutional soulsearching to realign constitutional aspirations of equality with social realities.
II. CASE HISTORY
R. v. N.S. originated as a procedural decision in a criminal preliminary inquiry. The
charges involved two men accused of historical sexual assault against a female relative. The
alleged abuse occurred between 1982 and 1987, beginning when the complainant was six
years old. As a teenager, she revealed the allegations to a high school teacher, but parental
reluctance held police back from laying charges. It was not until 2007 that N.S., now an adult
in her 30s, was able to lay a complaint and to proceed with charges in a prosecution in which
she would be the principal witness.

2

Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. The author acted as counsel to one
of the intervenors in R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, 290 CCC (3d). The opinions expressed herein are entirely
his own. He thanks numerous individuals for constructive conversations, including Benjamin Berger,
Sonia Lawrence, Bruce Ryder, Mihad Fahmy, Julia Williams, Fahad Siddiqui, Sharifa Khan, Nader
Hasan, Ranjan Agarwal, Mayya Mukhamedyarova, Fathima Cader, and Diana Younes.
R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, 290 CCC (3d) at paras 1, 4 [NS]. The niqab is contested amongst Muslims. For
some, it is believed to be a firm religious requirement; for others, it is a careful way to conform to a strict
Islamic rule of modesty in dress. For still many more, it is variously viewed as an uniecessary burden,
an anti-social affront, misguided asceticism, or a proclamation of fanaticism.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
[Charter].

872

ALBERTA LAW REVIEW

(2013) 50:4

As is common in sexual assault trials, the complainant's credibility as victim would be
critical to securing a conviction. But how would a trier of fact determine the credibility of
the alleged victim as a witness if her face were not fully exposed? How would defence
counsel be able to adequately test and press her evidence through cross-examination if she
were to have the advantage of concealing her expressions from the Court's gaze? These
questions were raised as a challenge to N.S.'s assertion that her constitutional right to
religious freedom assures accommodation of the niqab.
The accuseds objected to N.S.'s attire, asking the preliminary inquiry judge for an order
to require her to remove her niqab to testify. They claimed that their statutory right to crossexamine the witness was unfairly restricted and that any obstruction to counsel's ability to
effectively challenge the witness would improperly derogate from the constitutional right to
make full answer and defence. Further, they argued the possibility of imprisonment raised
a constitutional liberty interest, which should only be suspended in accordance with
principles of fundamental justice. The defence submitted that a witness's religious
preferences, however sincere, could not meet the test of fundamental justice if it leads to a
deprivation of liberty. Nothing short of "face-to-face" confrontation would satisfy the state's
constitutional obligations to the accused.
Addressing the preliminary inquiry judge without counsel, N.S. explained that she was a
devout Muslim who adopted the niqab as a form of religious practice, complying with a
faith-based conviction. 3 She stated that the niqab was a core tenet of her belief system and
personal identity.' She declared that she would be uncomfortable with removing the veil in
an open courtroom that was, by her description, "full of men."' She further highlighted the
fact that the accuseds were both members of her community and of her family; they even
attended the same mosque as her husband.6 Removing the veil in such circumstances, she
stated, would put her in a position of dishonour within the value system of her religiouscultural community, of which the accuseds were also members. She disagreed with defence
counsel that exposing her face would add any evidentiary value - "it's not going to help,
it really won't," she declared.' She reassured the Court that defence counsel would have
ample opportunity to read her body language and have direct eye contact during crossexamination.
The preliminary inquiry judge administered a form of the Amselem test, the Supreme
Court's lead precedent regarding religious accommodation, which requires the claimant to
establish a sincerely-held religious belief.' The judge found that N.S. had not established a
sufficiently "strong" belief because she admitted to having previously removed her niqab to

4

6

R v NS, 2010 ONCA 670 at paras 3-6, 262 CCC (3d) [NS, ONCA]. It is worth noting that at the
preliminary inquiry, NS's comments with respect to the sincerity of her religious belief and the impact
of removing the niqab were given unsworn, as the judge refused to administer the oath to the witness
while wearing her niqab.
See Natasha Bakht, "Objection, Your Honour! AccommodatingNiqab-Wearing Women in Courtrooms"
in Ralph Grillo et al, eds, Legal Practiceand CulturalDiversity(Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2009) 115
at 116 citing a variety of factors that may motivate women to adopt different forms of Islamic veil,
including hijab or niqab.
Transcript of preliminary inquiry, quoted in NS, ONCA, supra note 3 at para 5.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 SCR 551 [Amselem].
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be photographed for a driver's licence by a female official.' She had also stated that she
would, on request, remove her niqab for identification purposes at international border
crossings.
On appeal at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Justice Frank Marrocco rejected the
preliminary inquiryjudge's approach and reaffirmed theAmselem "subjective sincerity test,"
which requires evidence about the sincerity of the conviction, not the consistency of the
claimant's conduct.'o The Court held that "where an application is made to require a witness
to remove her niqab, the court must enquire into the reason for the wearing of the niqab and
the genuineness of any religious belief relied on to explain the wearing of the niqab.""
Quashing the preliminary inquiry judge's order requiring that N.S. testify without a niqab,
the matter was remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge for redetermination.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the Court considered the various aspects of
the case and sought to set out a framework for balancing the competing rights of a witness
to religious freedom with those of the accused to a fair trial. Justice Doherty, writing for the
panel, framed the issue at the very outset of his judgment as "an apparent conflict between
the constitutional rights of a witness in a criminal proceeding and the constitutional rights
of the accused in that same proceeding." 2 This framing recognized the presumptive interest
for a woman who wears the niqab to be accommodated while testifying. However, it also
took as a given that a witness testifying in a niqab would raise concerns about the fairness
of the trial.
Although the decision of the Court of Appeal affirmed that the niqab engaged
constitutional rights and triggered the duty to accommodate, N.S. appealed. The Court's
balancing test, framed to resolve the "conflict" between two opposed sets of interests and
rights (trial fairness versus religious freedom), had dominated the appellate Court's decision
and left N.S. subject to the substantial discretion of the criminal court judge. She would be
expected to explain and defend her religious attire in a pre-trial hearing before being
permitted to testify. Instead, she sought an outright recognition of a right to testify in a niqab.
The case captured the public's attention as it worked its way through the legal system. The
issue dovetailed with polarized public discourse around multiculturalism, immigration, and
the scope of public tolerance.' Five intervenors had appeared before the Court of Appeal,
representing groups concerned with the rights of the criminally accused, 4 the interests of

9

1o

12
1

14

NS, ONCA, supra note 3 at paras 6-7.
R vNS (2009), 95 OR (3d) 735 at paras 92-97 [NS, ONSC]. See also NS, supranote I at paras I 1-13 (per
McLachlin, CJ): "The preliminary inquiry judge failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into whether
N.S.'s refusal to remove her niqab was based on a sincere religious belief."
NS, ONCA, supra note 3 at para 13, referring to N.S., ONSC, ibid at paras 88-101.
NS, ONCA, ibid at para 1.
See e.g. Sheema Khan, "Hate it if you want, but don't ban the niqab," The Globe andMail(14 December
2011), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/hate-it-if-you-wantbut-dont-ban-the-niqab/article4180899> warning ofthe danger of banning unpopular minority opinions
and practices, especially where it exacerbates social exclusion. For a contrary, contemporaneous view,
see Barbara Kay, "Feminists back women as possessions in Supreme Court case," The National Post (9
December 2011), online: The National Post <http://www.fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/12/09/
barbara-kay-feminists-back-women-as-possessions-in-supreme-court-case/> warning of the danger of
mixing religion and state, and of allowing "multicultural correctness" to turn a blind eye to symbols of
inequality.
Criminal Lawyers' Association.
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sexual assault victims," individual expressive freedoms, 6 and competing approaches to
equality," amongst others. Nine were granted leave to make written submissions to the
Supreme Court,'" and three were also permitted time for oral argument.
III. JUDGMENT AT THE SUPREME COURT

The majority judgment, penned by Chief Justice McLachlin and endorsed by three others
of the seven-member panel (Justices Deschamps, Fish, and Cromwell), seized the middle
ground between the diametrically opposed minority judgment of Justice LeBel (joined by
Justice Rothstein) and Justice Abella's solo dissent.19 The majority judgment built on Justice
Doherty's proportionality approach, articulating a framework for trial judges to use when
deciding whether to allow a witness to testify in a niqab. The framework is comprised of four
sequential questions:
1.

Would requiring the witness to remove the niqab while testifying interfere with her religious
freedom?

2.

Would permitting the witness to wear the niqab while testifying create a serious risk to trial fairness?

3.

Is there a way to accommodate both rights and avoid the conflict between them?

4.

If no accommodation is possible, do the salutary effects of requiring the witness to remove the niqab
outweigh the deleterious effects of doing so?20

Under the first question, the inquiry incorporated the Amselem test. The claimant bears the
onus of establishing a sincere belief in a requirement to wear the niqab. Sincerity is not
compromised by lapsed practices or inconsistent observance. The Court resisted any
invitation to engage in evaluating or assessing a claimant's correctness of religious
observance, or the substantive coherence ofreligious lifestyle choices. Implicitly recognizing
that many religious people face tough choices all the time in secular society and routinely
strike compromises between their personal convictions and social realities, the Court refused
to allow past practice to define a claimant's sincerity ofbelief.2 1 On the facts of the N.S. case,
the Court could have ended the analysis at this point and remitted the matter to the
preliminary inquiry judge to re-determine the issue. But in the interest of articulating a

'"

16
17

I
9

20

21

Women's Legal and Education Action Fund (LEAF).
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA).
Ontario Human Rights Commission and the Muslim Canadian Congress. These two intervenors took
opposing views: the former highlighted the importance of accommodation and respect for religious
choices to promoting an inclusive society; the latter highlighted the oppressive nature of the niqab and
encouraged a ban to liberate Muslim women from patriarchal cultural practices.
In addition to the five intervenors at the Court ofAppeal, Supreme Court intervenors included the Barbra
Schlifer Commemorative Clinic, South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario (SALCO), Canadian Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) and the Barreau du Qu6bec.
NS, supranote I at para 2 (per McLachlin CJ): "A secular response that requires witnesses to park their
religion at the courtroom door is inconsistent with the jurisprudence and Canadian tradition, and limits
freedom ofreligion where no limit can be justified. On the other hand, a response that says a witness can
always testify with her face covered may render a trial unfair and lead to wrongful conviction."
NS, ibid at para 9.
Ibid at para 13.
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judicial approach to the broader issue of conflicting rights, the Court proceeded to explain
the subsequent questions to explore.
The second issue was whether the niqab posed a threat to trial fairness. The majority
highlighted two main components of the multilayered constitutional right to a fair trial. First
was the need for meaningful cross-examination, coupled with the importance of effective
credibility assessment. Chief Justice McLachlin was persuaded that the niqab posed a
presumptive obstruction to trial fairness because it prevents the accused, counsel, and the
22
court from viewing the witness's face during cross-examination. Rolled into this
presumption of obstruction was the idea that any limit on accessing demeanour evidence
compromises both the effectiveness of the cross-examination and the ability of the trier of
fact to assess credibility.23
Having set up the conflict of rights with the first two questions, the next question was to
ask whether the conflict could be resolved through accommodation or compromise. In order
to make this determination, the Court held that the parties should adduce evidence outlining
possible options that might yield a solution that respects both the witness's religious freedom
and the accused's right to a fair trial.24 Only if this aversion of conflict, or
"accommodation," 25 is impossible should the judge then move to the final question, which
involves a careful balancing of interests.
Upon reaching the balancing stage, trial judges were directed to determine whether the
salutary effects of requiring the witness to remove the niqab outweigh the deleterious effects
of allowing her to wear it. This test is lifted from the Supreme Court's section I
26
Justification
jurisprudence dealing with justifying government incursions on Charterrights.
of a rights breach requires reasoning, and for at least the past 20 years, Canadian courts have
employed the proportionality inquiry.27 Proportionality, orjustificatory analysis, was likely
considered appropriate here because, regardless of how the niqab question will be resolved
in any particular case, the impact would necessarily be interpreted as a limitation of one party
or the other's Charterright.
Looking at the deleterious effects of limiting a Charter right, the Court described two
levels of potential harm. The first involved the direct and personal impact on the affected
individual, which necessitates considering both subjective and objective factors, such as the
"value of adherence to a religious conviction," the importance of the "practice to the
2
claimant," and the "degree of state interference with the religious practice." 8 The second
level of inquiry involved considering the "broader societal harms of requiring a witness to
remove the niqab in order to testify."29 This latter inquiry focused not on the individual
impact that accompanies a court order to unveil, but the wider consequences of discouraging

22

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Ibid at paras 20-2 1, acknowledging that the evidentiary "record sheds little light on the question of
whether seeing a witness's face is important to effective cross-examination and credibility assessment
and hence to trial fairness."
Ibid at paras 25-27.
Ibid at paras 30-33.
Ibid at para 32.
See R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 [Oakes].
Dagenais v CanadianBroadcastingCorp, [ 1994] 3 SCR 835 at 878 [Dagenais].
NS, supranote I at para 36.
Ibid at para 37.
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potential complainants and witnesses from reporting offences, pursuing prosecution, or
participating in the justice system." This factor would be especially concerned with
consequences for sex crime prosecutions, described by the Court as being "vigorously
pursued" by the justice system in recent decades."
Turning to salutary effects, the majority characterized the primary benefits of forcing a
witness to remove her niqab as "preventing harm to the fair trial interest of the accused and
safeguarding the repute of the administration of justice."32 Because the niqab imposes a
"severe" cost on the individual's right to "effective cross-examination and credibility
assessment,"" its restriction would, under this analysis, often be necessary to protect trial
fairness. Indeed, for the majority, the more important the witness's evidence to the trial, the
less likely that she would be permitted to testify in a niqab. The majority did not, however,
go so far as to create an absolute ban on niqabs. The judgment noted that it is onlyjustifiable
to compel the removal of the niqab where the risk to trial fairness is, as the Court stated in
Dagenais, "real and substantial."34 An absolute ban would capture witnesses whose
testimony would not pose such danger to trial fairness. Chief Justice McLachlin pointed out
that "uncontested and uncontroversial evidence does not engage the fair trial interest.""
Indeed, this would likely be the only type of evidence from behind a niqab that would not
imperil a fair trial.
The result of the majority's reasoning is that where the proceeding involves high stakes
(such as the potential of imprisonment for the accused) and where the witness's evidence is
critical and contested (as in most sexual assault prosecutions), a woman in a niqab will
almost certainly be required to expose her face for cross-examination." The majority further
rejected certain exceptions that the Court ofAppeal had endorsed. For instance, Chief Justice
McLachlin was sceptical of the suggestion that the harm to trial fairness would be diminished
in a trial before a judge alone (as compared to a judge and jury). She was doubtful that a
judge would be able to predict whether the niqab would interfere with credibility assessments
at trial based solely on inquiries into the witness's religious freedom claim in the setting of
a preliminary inquiry." Similarly, she was not convinced that, in a jury trial, a judge's
curative instruction could mitigate any harm caused by a witness's niqab." The result of the
majority judgment is a proportionality test that creates a de facto rule that women
complainants in sexual assault cases must unveil to testify for the prosecution.

30
3
32
33

34
35

36

3
3

Ibid at para 37.
Ibid. This argument was emphasized in the intervenor submissions ofthe Barbra Shlifer Commemorative
Clinic and the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario (SALCO).
NS, ibid at para 38.
Ibidatpara38.
Ibid at para 28, citing Dagenais,supranote 27 at 878, in which the Court stated that any risk to trial
fairness must be "real and substantial."
NS, supra note I at para 56.
On 24 April 2013, Justice Weisman of the Ontario Court of Justice applied the majority judgment to
decide whether to permit N.S. to testify in niqab and concluded: "Having followed the directions of the
Supreme Court on this voir dire, I find that I am obliged to require N.S. to remove her niqab while
testifying at the preliminary inquiry" (The Queen v M-dSand M-1S (24 April 2013) (Ont Ct J)).
NS, supra note I at para 41.
Ibid, at para 42.
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IV. MINORITY AND DISSENT

The minority judgment of Justices LeBel and Rothstein reached the same outcome as the
majority, but adopted a very different analysis. In particular, the minority justices rejected
the majority's acceptance of the principle that a witness should be permitted to testify in a
niqab, subject to a case-by-case proportionality exercise. For Justice LeBel, only a "clear
rule"39 could provide the necessary constitutional assurances of trial fairness.4 From this
perspective, the balancing of interests was settled: legal tradition regarding participation in
the trial process was sufficiently tied to foundational common law and constitutional values
that the niqab should never be accommodated. 4 1 Conditioning the respect for differences on
the "preserv[ation] of common values of Canadian society," Justice LeBel identified a "core
common value" of open-faced communication.42 By this logic: "A clear rule that niqabs may
not be worn would be consistent with the principle of openness ofthe trial process and would
safeguard the integrity of that process as one of communication.' 3
Justice Abella took the opposite position, refusing to concede that the niqab is,
presumptively, an obstruction to a fair trial and rejecting the idea of a ban, whether explicit
or de facto. She relied on a variety of sources, highlighted by many of the intervenors and
mostly ignored by the majority, which cast doubt on the value of demeanour evidence." She
further noted that if a "rule" of open-faced examination exists, it is subject to routine
exceptions. She cited examples of courts that "regularly accept the testimony of witnesses
whose demeanour can only be partially observed."45 These included witnesses who cannot
hear,46 who require the use of a language interpreter,47 who have physical or mental
disabilities which impact their cognitive or expressive functions,48 who are children,49 or who
are not able to be present and instead give evidence by telephone."o Invoking the Court's
reasoning in R. v. Mills that trial fairness must account for more than just the accused's best
interests, but also the "view of fairness in the eyes of the community and the complainant,"'"
Justice Abella encouraged a deeper enquiry into what fairness owes those with personal
characteristics that require special consideration. She concluded that "trial fairness cannot
reasonably expect ideal testimony from an ideal witness in every case."52
3

40
41

42

43
4

45
46
47
48

49

so
5'

52

Ibid at para 78
Ibid at para 69 (per LeBel J): "[T]he niqab should be allowed either in all cases or not at all ... a clear
rule should be chosen."
Ibidat para 67 (per LeBel J): "[T]he Canadian criminal trial process remains faithful in its core aspects
to an adversarial model. This process developed in the common law. Some of its features are now part
of the constitutional order.... This model ofjustice imposes a significant personal burden on witnesses
and parties. This burden cannot be lifted entirely."
Ibid at paras 70-71.
Ibid at para 78.
Ibid at paras 98-108.
Ibidat para 102. The minorityjustices accepted that exceptions are warranted in some cases, but rejected
an exceptionalism approach in this case (at para 75).
Ibidatpara 102.
Ibid at para 92.
Ibid at para 103. Justice LeBel drew a distinction between people with physical disabilities that impair
communication and a woman in niqab. For the disabled, the accommodation will be an assistive
mechanism that promotes their communication, while the niqab "does not facilitate acts of
communication" (at para 77). The logic of this argument, of course, fails to explain how a ban on the
niqab promotes communication when it will have the effect of silencing many women who would
otherwise testify.
Ibid at para 92, citing the use of screens for children.
Ibidat para 104.
Ibid at para 95, citing Rv Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668 at para 72.
NS, ibidat para 107.
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THE JUDGMENT: OPINION AND IMPACT

No doubt, opinions about the Court's ruling in N.S. are as diverse as the competing
viewpoints at play in the judgments. It is rare for the Court to be so divided." From the
perspective of conventional rights analysis, the majority's approach reflected the dominant
jurisprudential trend.54 Indeed, virtually all of the judicial analysis at all levels of court
assumed that the case should be analyzed as a "conflict" of rights requiring "balancing." The
conflict was framed as freedom of religion versus trial fairness. The freedom of religion
claim was grounded in multiculturalist values, while the trial fairness argument was rooted
in the values of the adversarial system. Two important "justice" causes - the protection of
minorities and the protection of the criminally accused - were at odds in this logic. Because
both sides' claims were just, but pitted the interests of two vulnerable individuals in conflict,
the case presented a classic dilemma.
N.S.'s claim did not dispute the importance of the accused's right to a fair trial, but rather
questioned the particular threat that the niqab could actually pose to the accused's
constitutional trial rights, including the presumption of innocence and right not to be unjustly
deprived of liberty. This challenge required the Court to consider the logic and evidentiary
basis for constitutionalizing specific forms of courtroom practice, such as open-faced crossexamination. The Court did not find any evidence to support the assumption that the ability
to see a witness's entire face is necessary for effective cross-examination or credibility
assessment,5 5 nor did it hear any evidence to support the contrary assertion.s6 All the Court
had to rely on was the "common law assumption" that witnesses in criminal courts are
expected to testify "with their faces visible to counsel, the judge and the jury."" For the
majority, this "ancient and persistent connection"" between open-faced testimony and a fair
trial would prevail, absent evidence to refute the "long-standing assumptions of the common
law regarding the importance of a witness's facial expressions to cross-examination and
credibility assessment.""
The second formulation of trial fairness in the majority's judgment emphasized systemic
and institutional integrity. This view concentrated on public interest considerations and

5

Kirk Makin, "Changes coming fast for Supreme Court" The Globe and Mail (29 March 2013), online:
The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-lawpage/changes-coming-fast-for-supreme-court/articlel0585748/>: "Of the 66 substantial decisions it
rendered last year [2012], the court spoke unanimously in 65 per cent of the cases."
See Oakes, supranote 26.
NS, supra note I at para 17 (per McLachlin CJ): "We have no expert evidence in this case on the
importance of seeing a witness's face to effective cross-examination and accurate assessment of a
witness's credibility. All we have are arguments and several legal and social science articles submitted
by the parties as authorities."
Ibid at paras 20-21.
Ibid at paras 21-22. The experience of the United States is instructive, as this issue has arisen under the
Sixth Amendment of its Constitution, which expressly links the right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him" to the right to a fair trial (US Const amend VI). Justice Antonin Scalia of the
Supreme Court ofthe United States, a fervent originalist interpreter of the US constitution, has described
the defendant's right to a "face-to-face" confrontation with witnesses as a constitutional custom "that
traces back to the beginnings of Western legal culture" (Coy v Iowa, 487 US 1012 at 1015-19 (1988)),
writing for a 6-3 majority. In a subsequent decision, the Court reversed, splitting 5-4, with Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor writing that face-to-face confrontation is an important but not "indispensable element"
of the confrontation right (Marylandv Craig,497 US 836 at 837 (1990)).
NS, ibidat para 31.

59

Ibid at para 22.

5

54
5s

56

5
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prioritized the maintenance of confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole.60 Yet,
the majority's consideration of the public interest was remarkably narrow, focussing almost
entirely on the public perception of the treatment of the accused in the trial process. Fairness
was defined as an abstract and idealized standard ofaccuseds' rights, with little consideration
of the perspectives of other participants in the trial such as victims of sexual assault or
vulnerable members ofthe public. The judgment similarly neglected to analyze what fairness
might mean in different cultural contexts or how blind spots about the impact of "neutral"
rules could contribute to systemic social exclusion.
For those concerned with the sex equality and social diversity implications ofthe decision,
the effect of the majority's balancing test (and of the minority's ban) will be seen to shift the
state's constitutional burden of providing a fair trial onto the niqab-wearing witness. The
witness must now choose whether to break a religious conviction in order to deliver a fair
trial to the accused, knowing that the more central her evidence is to the likelihood of
conviction, the less likely she is to be permitted to testify in niqab. If she chooses not to
testify, the state will be faced with a choice: either it abandons the prosecution due to lack
of evidence, or it asks the court to compel the witness to give her evidence unveiled. This last
option lies at the bottom of the slippery slope of state intrusion into personal expression.
Forced removal of witnesses' niqabs would have both liberty and dignity limiting effects,
with heightened adverse impact because it would primarily affect vulnerable minorities.
Perhaps the most cross-purpose outcome is the scenario of an accused woman unable to
testify in her own defence, or in someone else's, on account of the niqab."
Although the majority were prepared to tolerate some uncomfortable outcomes in the
interest of preserving tried and tested practices, they rejected the minority's call for an
outright ban on niqabs. Yet, despite citing values ofdiversity, inclusion, and access tojustice,
the majority's analytical framework leads to the inevitable result that women like N.S. will
find themselves outside of Charter protection. This outcome roused Justice Abella, who
noted the logical disjuncture between the stated Charter values and the necessary
implications of the majority judgment:
The majority's conclusion that being unable to see the witness' face is acceptable from a fair trial perspective
if the evidence is "uncontested", essentially means that sexual assault complainants, whose evidence will
inevitably be contested, will be forced to choose between laying a complaint and wearing a niqab, which,
62
as previously noted, may be no meaningful choice at all.

If the judgment represented a clear victory for trial fairness it might perhaps have been
celebrated. However, it remains unclear from the majority judgment what trial fairness means
beyond its discomfort with the niqab. While courts have generally taken witnesses as they
are, this case makes state interference in intimate personal characteristics a matter of trial
judge discretion. The majority agreed unquestioningly that "more is better" when it comes
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Ibid at para 38, emphasizing the importance of preserving "public confidence in the justice system."
Ibid at para 109. Justice Abella highlighted this point.
Ibid at para 96. See supra note 31 citing Justice Weisman's April 2013 order that NS remove her niqab
to testify.
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to exposing the face." But is the "most" physical exposure the "best" condition for crossexamination? If so, is the "best" form of cross-examination the standard required for
constitutional compliance? If so, why stop at removing niqabs?
The justification for enforcing a strict rule (or narrow test) against the niqab was wrapped
in commitments to constitutional values. Meanwhile, N.S. lacked the evidence to rebut the
presumptions of established courtroom practice. Given the legal system's preference for
precedent, the status quo shifts languidly if at all. It is thus noteworthy that all of the justices
appear to have agreed with the principle that even strict rules regarding trial fairness require
flexibility.' Such flexibility not only helps to mitigate for individual variation and different
needs, but also to correct the trajectory of institutional inertia. The numerous exceptions to
conventional courtroom rules, emphasized by many intervenors and highlighted in Justice
Abella's judgment, suggested that trial fairness has long been an elastic concept, moulding
to real-world circumstances and accommodating novel needs.
Examples of rule flexibility may be presented as derogation, but they can also represent
principled and necessary modifications to the institutional modes of administering justice.
Accommodation doctrine is derived from normative commitments to equality, and is
enshrined in the Charter as part of section 15.65 Even when section 15 is not explicitly
invoked, accommodation analysis always raises themes ofsubstantive equality. For example,
the fact that thejustice system enables individuals to give testimony through assistive devices
or with the help of a sign or language interpreter is integral to achieving the goals of the
justice system." These measures become necessary norms to facilitate the goals of open
justice, but also to remove barriers to equal participation.67 Accommodation can promote the
public interests of communication, inclusion, and participation in the administration of
justice, while also enhancing the dignity interest of the affected individuals." Justice Abella
noted the link between the denial of accommodation and its discriminatory impact:
As a result, as the majority notes, complainants who sincerely believe that their religion requires them to wear
the niqab in public, may choose not to bring charges for crimes they allege have been committed against
them, or, more generally, may resist being a witness in someone else's trial. It is worth pointing out as well
that where the witness is the accused, she will be unable to give evidence in her own defence. To those
affected, this is like hanging a sign over the courtroom door saying "Religious minorities not welcome.' "
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Even Justice Abella in her dissent, stated: "I concede without reservation that seeing more of
a witness'
facial expressions is better than seeing less. What I am not willing to concede, however, is that seeing
less is so impairing of a judge's or an accused's ability to assess the credibility of a witness, that the
complainant will have to choose between her religious rights and her ability to bear witness against an
alleged aggressor" (NS, ibid at para 82).
Even the minority justices, who supported a clear ban on the niqab, recognized the need for
accommodation in some instance to facilitate "access tojustice" for people with disabilities. See NS, ibid
at para 77.
Supra note 2, s 15.
NS, supranote I at para 92.
See e.g. Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [ 1997] 3 SCR 624 (concerning the adverse
effects discrimination caused by a hospital's failure to provide sign language interpretation).
The minority judgment focused on the goal of "communication," viewing the niqab as an obstacle. See
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VI. CONCLUSION

In many respects, the N.S. case put the criminal trial system itself on trial. Could
conventional standards of justice be met while modifying traditional courtroom practices?
This was certainly not the first time the Court was called upon to examine traditional norms
in the face of evolving social pressures. In Chief Justice McLachlin's opus on
accommodation, British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission v.
BCGSEU), the Court rejected a workplace physical standard that adversely affected the
female claimant because it bore only tenuous connection to the desired outcome of workplace
efficiency and safety.70 The Court required more than impressions from past practice to
justify a standard that excluded the claimant from employment. Evidence of actual risk or
harm to a legitimate specific objective had to be shown. In N.S., the Court acknowledged that
there was no evidence of any harm to trial fairness caused by a partially covered face.
Demeanour was not proven to be essential to cross-examination or credibility assessment,
despite being a longstanding customary practice. Notwithstanding this dearth of evidence,
the Court was not persuaded to follow its doctrine of bending neutral rules when they have
exclusionary effects.
It is tempting to view N.S. as a singular case. As much as it attracts an accommodation
analysis, the implications of constitutionalizing the niqab generated concern for some about
undermining fundamental civic values. Indeed, just days after the Supreme Court heard oral
argument in the case, the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism issued
an operational bulletin outlining a new requirement that individuals taking the citizenship
oath must expose their faces." In public remarks, Minister Jason Kenney addressed women
in niqab directly: "All we ask of you is to fulfil the requirements of citizenship and that you
swear an oath before your fellow citizens that you will be loyal to our traditions that go back
centuries."72 The Minister emphasized that an open-faced oath was more than a technical
requirement and that it goes to the heart of our collective identity: "It is a public declaration
that you are joining the Canadian family, and it must be taken freely and openly-not with
faces hidden."73 A similar conception of citizenship motivated the introduction of Bill 94 in
the Quebec National Assembly.7 4 This law requires women in niqab to unveil in order to
receive a wide range of government services. Not surprisingly, both the Quebec legislation
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unanimous Court: "Employers designing workplace standards owe an obligation to be aware of both the
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conceptions of equality into workplace standards" (ibid at para 68).
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Operational Bulletin 359, "Requirements for candidates to be seen
taking the Oath of Citizenship at a ceremony and prodedures for candidates with full or partial face
coverings" (12 December 2011), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.cal
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Bill 94, An Act to establishguidelinesgoverningaccommodation requests within theAdministrationand
certain institutions, 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2011.
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and Minister Kenney's bulletin garnered significant public attention and fuelled a spirited
debate.
The immediate impact of the N.S. decision is narrow: few women in Canada currently
wear the niqab and a small minority of them can be expected to encounter the criminaljustice
system. But how related and emerging questions might be answered will depend on a host
of political and other factors, including the substantial renewal of the bench already
underway at the Supreme Court." The minority judgment, endorsed by two justices in the
twilight of their tenure, provided a constitutional justification for an absolute ban on niqabs
in the courtroom. Their reasoning would lend support to those making legal arguments to
extend a niqab ban to citizenship ceremonies and other public services. But the minority's
justification of a ban was rejected by both the majority and dissent. The Court resoundingly
endorsed a fundamental principle of inclusion and accommodation of women in niqab. This
principle is not absolute, though, and is subject to reasonable limits based on legitimate
objectives and actual harm, analyzed through the proportionality test. That the principle of
accommodation was articulated in a case involving a competing interest of the highest order
- an accused's liberty - suggests that the accommodation right that adheres to the niqab
is indeed secure. It is difficult to imagine that an outright ban in a public setting could ever
be constitutionally justified based on the majority's reasoning in N.S. Governments wishing
to restrict the wearing of the niqab in accordance with proportionality will need evidence
establishing a real and clear danger to a more important interest. Whether the governments
of Canada or Quebec will revisit their approaches to niqabs in citizenship ceremonies and
public services, respectively, remains to be seen. It may be just a matter of time before the
Supreme Court is once again asked to define the constitutional rights of veiled Muslim
women.
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Makin, supra note 53, noting that, "By the end of 2014, only one judge McLachlin - will have spent more than a decade on Canada's top bench."
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